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CREDITORS' RIGHTS
by
William V. Dorsaneo, III*
N addition to coverage of recent developments in the subject areas dealt
with in the 1977 Survey article on creditors' rights, developments in the
consumer law area and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act' have been added
this year. Major changes in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure concerning
attachment, garnishment, and sequestration are treated separately in the last
section of this survey article.
I. EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES AND EXECUTION
Only three important garnishment cases were decided during the survey
period. In Kirso v. Heard2 the garnishor attempted to mandamus a district
court judge to enter a judgment against a garnishee. The court of civil
appeals denied the motion for leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus
because the application for garnishment was defective. The garnishor failed
to state under oath that the action was not brought to injure either of the
defendants and that neither of them had property, within the affiant's
3
knowledge, subject to execution which would satisfy the judgment.
In United States v. Stelte 4 the court held that an ex-wife who had been
awarded a portion of her ex-husband's military retirement pay as her share
of the community estate could enforce the award by garnishing the United
States. The court rejected on public policy grounds' the ex-husband's argument that the federal statute permitting garnishment 6 was inapplicable by its
express terms.
The third garnishment case involved an attempt to garnish funds held by a
district clerk. In Celanese Coating Co. v. Soliz 7 funds had been deposited
into the registry of the court in satisfaction of a judgment obtained by the
defendants against a third party. That judgment provided that the balance of
* B.A., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., University of Texas. Associate Professor of
law, Southern Methodist University.
1. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
2. 547 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ).
3. Id. at 324. The court's holding is based upon Buerger v. Wells, 110 Tex. 577, 222 S.W.
151 (1920), which held only that the application should contain sworn allegations that "the
defendants" do not have property, within the knowledge of the affiant, subject to execution
which would satisfy the judgment. See also Mackey v. Lucey Prods. Corp., 150 Tex. 188, 239
S.W.2d 607 (1951). The court's suggestion that it is also necessary for the application to state
that the garnishment applied for is not sued out to injure the defendant or garnishee is,
however, incorrect since it is necessary only when the writ is sued out before judgment. TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4076(2)(3) (Vernon 1971).
4. 553 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ granted).
5. Id. at 229: "Otherwise, the beneficial spirit of the law would be sacrificed to its letter."
6. 42 U.S.C. § 659 (Supp. IV 1974) provides that the United States "shall be subject, in
like manner and to the same extent as if the United States were a private person, to legal
process brought for the enforcement, against [an] individual [entitled to remuneration for
employment] of his legal obligations to provide child support or make alimony payments."
7. 541 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the funds remaining after certain deductions would be paid to the defendants
"and Bank of North Texas, Hurst, Texas." 8 Hence, the funds held were
jointly owned by the defendants and the bank. The garnishor sought to
garnish the funds by instituting a post-judgment garnishment proceeding.
The bank promptly intervened and set up a claim to the funds. After a jury
trial, the funds were awarded to the bank. 9 The garnishor argued that the
bank had failed to show that it was entitled to receive all of the funds. The
court held that since the judgment evidenced the fact that the funds in the
clerk's possession were jointly owned by the defendants and the bank, the
garnishor had the burden of proving what portion, if any, was severally
owing to the judgment debtors. The garnishor failed to satisfy this burden.
One case decided during the survey period dealt with the issue of encumbrances upon a homestead. In Means v. United FidelityLife Insurance Co. 10
the plaintiffs sought to recover title to and possession of an alleged 200-acre
rural homestead which was part of a larger tract. At the time of the purchase
of the tract in 1969 the grantor retained a vendor's lien and obtained a deed
of trust from the plaintiffs to secure the balance of the purchase price.
Subsequently, the note evidencing the balance of the purchase price, the
vendor's lien, and the deed of trust were assigned to a savings and loan
association. Thereafter, the plaintiffs executed deeds of trust in connection
with loans made to finance the construction of permanent improvements on
the tract. The loans were extended, renewed, and consolidated. By March
1972 the loans totaled $25,000 payable to the First Savings and Loan Association of Odessa. A $75,000 loan, secured by a deed of trust lien on the
homestead tract and on two other tracts, was then obtained from the First
City Mortgage Company of Dallas, which thereafter transferred both the
note and the lien-to the United Fidelity Life Insurance Company. Approximately one-third of the $75,000 loan was used to pay the balance of the
principal and interest owed to the First Savings and Loan Association of
Odessa. The plaintiffs defaulted on the loan, and defendant United Fidelity
Life Insurance Company at a trustee's sale purchased the homestead tract
and one other tract for $56,250.
Against this factual background the plaintiffs contended that the foreclosure sale of their homestead-was invalid because the deed of trust lien was
invalid. In rejecting this contention, the court of civil appeals held that the
United Fidelity Life Insurance Company was subrogated to the rights of the
savings and loan association because the Odessa association had a valid lien
on the homestead tract and a portion of the $75,000 loan proceeds had been
used to pay the valid encumbrance."1
The plaintiffs' next contended that the foreclosure, made without consideration of the equities existing in plaintiffs' favor, was unauthorized. The
8. Id. at 246.
9. Id.at 248.
10. 550 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
11. Despite the fact that the court of civil appeals concluded that the subrogation was
contractual and agreed to by the plaintiffs, the court went on to say "it makes no difference
whether the party, on the payment of the money, took an assignment of the mortgage or a
release, or whether a discharge was made and the evidence of the debt cancelled." Id. at 309.
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court rejected this argument for three reasons. Initially, the court held that
by failing properly to demand that the non-exempt acreagebe sold first, the
plaintiffs waived any right to require segregation. Secondly, the plaintiffs
failed to tender that portion of the debt, totaling approximately $27,000,
chargeable against the homestead by virtue of the defendant's subrogation
rights. Finally, the plaintiffs had not obtained a jury determination of the
200-acre homestead's proportionate value in relation to the whole acreage
upon which foreclosure was ordered. Consequently, the plaintiffs failed to
substantiate their claim that the unsegregated homestead property brought
more than the legal debt against it.
II.

SWORN ACCOUNTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES

Procedural errors made in connection with sworn account practice under
rule 18512 continued during the survey period. In Dixon v. Mayfield Building
Supply Co. 13 the defendant's pleading did not contain a'properly verified
denial. His answer, although containing an effective assertion that each and
every item in the account made the basis of the suit was "wholly not just and
true," was not supported by a proper oath or affidavit; a modified form of
an acknowledgment was used rather than a jurat. 14 The defendant, however,
contended that he was a stranger to the transaction and accordingly was not
required to make a verified denial. 5 In rejecting this contention, the court
held that the exception is not available when the plaintiff's pleadings or the
invoices or other evidence exhibited as the basis for the obligation reflect
that the defendant was a party to the transaction.1 6
The recovery of attorneys' fees in connection with suits on sworn accounts was considered in T.J. Service Co. v. MajorEnergy Co. 17The court
there held that the plaintiff could not rely upon the sworn account provision
of article 222618 because the appellate record did not evidence a transaction
whereby title to personal property passed from plaintiff to defendant.' 9
Similarly, in Barcheers v. Braswell20 the plaintiff was not permitted to base
his claim for attorneys' fees under the sworn account provision of article
12. TEX. R. Civ. P. 185.

13. 543 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
14. The form used was:
Before me, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared
CHARLES DIXON, known to me to be the person who executed the foregoing
instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the same for the purposes
therein expressed and the facts contained therein are true and correct.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF OFFICE on this the 26 day of
October, 1975.
Id. at 7.
15. Id. at 8.
16. See Boysen v. Security Lumber Co., 531 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1975, no writ, discussedin Dorsaneo, Creditors'Rights, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31
Sw. L.J. 213, 227-28 (1977).
17. 552 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
18. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1978). The amendment to the
statute, effective Sept. 1, 1977, appears to eliminate this problem because attorneys' fees are
now recoverable in connection with "suits founded on oral or written contracts." See 1977 Tex.
Gen. Laws ch. 76, § 1, at 153.
19. See Van Zandt v. Fort Worth Press, 359 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. 1962); Meaders v. Biskamp,
159 Tex. 79, 82-83, 316 S.W.2d 75, 78 (1958).
20. 548 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ).
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2226 because "the words 'suits founded upon a sworn account or accounts'
as used in article 2226 mean a suit for goods, wares and merchandise." 2 The
plaintiff was, however, permitted to recover attorneys' fees under the
statutory provision authorizing their recovery for the prosecution of claims
for services rendered. In this connection, the court held that the services
22
need no longer be personally rendered by the claimant.
In Johnson-WalkerMoving & Storage, Inc. v. Lane ContainerCo. 23 the
defendant appeared for trial and announced that a cashier's check in the
principal amount of the action had been mailed to the plaintiff. The cashier's
check was received but no additional amount in payment of attorneys' fees,
interest, and court costs was tendered. Subsequently, the trial court rendered judgment against the defendant for court costs, interest, and attorneys' fees. The court of civil appeals reversed the trial court judgment
because the receipt of the principal amount of the debt was a bar to any
claim for interest where no express contract or obligation to pay interest
existed. Since article 2226 requires the plaintiff to "finally obtain judgment"
for some part of his claim, once the principal was paid, no part of the claim
remained unpaid because the interest award, which was itself based upon
statute,24 was unauthorized. Interest provided for by article 5069-1.0325 is
not recoverable once the principal is paid, even if the principal is received
26
under protest.
The most significant development in the area of recovery of attorneys'
2
fees was the substantial revision of article 2226 by the Texas Legislature.
Three major changes were made in the statute. First, "suits founded on oral
or written contracts" will support a recovery of a reasonable amount as
attorneys' fees, if at the expiration of thirty days after a valid claim for
payment is made to the defendant or an authorized agent, "payment for the
just amount owing has not been tendered." 2 It is important to note,
however, that contracts of insurers have been specifically exempted
from the application of the new statutory language. 29 Secondly, the statutory
21. Id. at 79.
22. See Caston v. Texas Power & Light Co., 501 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1973, no writ). See also Howard v. French-Brown Floors Co., 542 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1976, no writ); Alpert v. Jarrell Carpentry Co., 510 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1974, no writ).
23. 548 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
24. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1971) provides:

When no specified rate of interest is'agreed upon by the parties, interest at the
rate of six percent per annum shall be allowed on all written contracts ascertaining
the sum payable, from and after the time when the sum is due and payable; and on
all open accounts, from the first day of January after the same are made.
25. Id.
26. 548 S.W.2d at 502.
27. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
28. Id. The amendment probably eliminates the "special contract" limitation on the recovery of attorneys' fees in the sworn account context. See Langdeau v. Bouknight, 162 Tex. 42,
50, 344 S.W.2d 435, 441 (1961); Meders v. Biskamp, 159 Tex. 79, 83, 316 S.W.2d 75, 78 (1958);
Jackson v. Paulsel Lumber Co., 461 S.W.2d 161, 170 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1970, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
29. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1978) states:
The provisions hereof shall not apply to contracts of insurers subject to the
provisions of the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act (Article 21.21-2 Insurance Code), nor shall it apply to contracts of any insurer subject to the provisions
of Article 3.62, Insurance Code, or to Chapter 387, Acts of the 55th Legislature,
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reference to the minimum fee schedule has been deleted. The State Bar
Minimum Fee Schedule no longer constitutes prima facie evidence of reasonable attorneys' fees.3 0 Apparently, the amount of reasonable attorneys'
fees will now be determined in the same manner as any other question of
fact. 31 Finally, the statutory language requiring the claimant to obtain a final
judgment for some part of his claim has been excised. Thus, the question is
raised whether the claimant must still fulfill the previous final-judgment
requirement. Since, however, the attorneys' fees are still recoverable "in
addition to his claim and costs," the alteration of the statutory language has

probably not modified the prior case law in this respect.32
III.

A.

USURY

Guaranty/SuretyshipObligations

Two cases decided during the survey period dealt with the question of a
surety's entitlement to assert a claim or defense of usury in connection with
certain loans made to corporations. In V.LP. Commercial Contractors v.
Alkas 33 the noteholder instituted suit against two corporations and a corporate president who had signed the note in his individual capacity. 34 The
corporate officer contended that he was no more than "an accommodation
maker," 35 and not a guarantor of a corporate obligation who would consequently be precluded from raising a claim or defense of usury under article
1302-2.09.36

Citing Universal Metals & Machinery, Inc. v. Bohart,37 the court
concluded that the corporate officer had no basis for a valid usury defense
or claim.
In holding that accommodation makers may not assert that the underlying
loan transaction is usurious when the corporate party accommodated cannot
do so, the court characterized an accommodation maker's contract as one of
Regular Session, 1957, as amended (Article 3.62-1 Vernon's Texas Insurance
Code), or to Article 21.21, Insurance Code or to Article 21.21, Insurance Code, as
amended or to Chapter 9, Insurance Code, as amended, and each such article or
chapter shall remain in full force and effect.
30. The practice of setting minimum fee schedules by a state bar association has been held
to violate the price fixing prohibitions of the Sherman Act. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773 (1975). The Texas Supreme Court had also held that the "prima facie" evidence
provision was inapplicable to summary judgment practice. Coward v. Gateway Nat'l Bank, 525
S.W.2d 857, 859-60 (Tex. 1975).
31. See Rice v. Nu-Ray Elec. Co., 514 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974,
no writ); Braswell v. Braswell, 476 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, writ dism'd).
But see TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a, amended effective Jan. 1, 1978, which permits use of affidavits by
experts. See also Coward v. Gateway Nat'l Bank, 525 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1975).
32. See Askso Eng'r Corp. v. Mobil Chem. Corp., 535 S.W.2d 893, 897 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [ist Dist.] 1976, no writ).
33. 553 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio, 1977, no writ).
34. Id.at 657.
35. An accommodation maker is one who signs the instrument in any capacity for the
purpose of lending his name to another party to the instrument. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN.
§ 3.415(a) (Vernon 1968). Furthermore, an accommodation maker is a surety with a right of
recourse on the instrument against the party accommodated if he, the accommodation maker,
pays. Id. § 3.415(e).
36. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon Supp. 1978) provides that "the
claim or defense of usury by such corporation, its successors, guarantors, assigns or anyone on
its behalf is prohibitied .... "
37. 539 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. 1976), discussed in Dorsaneo, supra note 16, at 232-34.
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suretyship rather than of joint obligation.38 Like an accommodation maker, a
guarantor of payment is a surety 39 who agrees to pay the instrument according to its tenor without resort by the holder to any other party. 4° Therefore,
the court concluded that both guarantors and accommodation makers should41
stand on the same footing with respect to the claim or defense of usury.

This conclusion is sensible because it recognizes that the distinction between an accommodation maker and a guarantor of payment is one of form
and not of substance. Therefore, since a guarantor of payment of a corpo-

rate obligation is precluded from effectively maintaining a claim or defense
of usury under article 1302-2.0942 in connection 'with corporate obligations
of $5,000 or more under the supreme court's holding in Bohart, accommodation makers should likewise be barred from so doing.

3

In the second case dealing with article 1302-2.09, Hutchison v. Commercial Trading Co. ,44 a guarantor of payment of a corporate obligation sought
to assert a claim of usury on the theory that the lender utilize l a corporate
structure as a scheme to evade the interest limits set by article 5069-1.02.
Confronted with the rule in Skeen v. Glenn Justice Mortgage Co. ,' that
"[tihe mere fact that the corporation was formed in order to obtain the loan
. . . does not render the transaction void or illegal"

47

so long as the corpo-

rate rate is not exceeded, plaintiff argued that his assignor was the alter ego
of the corporation and that the Skeen precedent was, therefore, not controlling.4 8 The district court stated that the essence of the Skeen holding was
estoppel. 49 The court then concluded that because an ongoing corporate
entity constituted the corporate vehicle, because the guarantor Was not
inexperienced in the business world or at borrowing money, and because no
facts concerning fraud or other illegality were alleged, the plaintiff had not
stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.
38. 553 S.W.2d at 658. It had previously been held that when an individual and a corporation execute a "joint and several" note as comakers, the individual has a cause of action for
usury if the individual rate is exceeded. Sud v. Morris, 492 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1973, no writ).
39. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(40) (Vernon 1968) provides that the term
"surety" shall include "guarantor."
40. Id. § 3.416(a).
41. See id. § 3.416(b).
42. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
43. It could be argued that the article does not explicitly preclude "accommodation makers" from successfully making a claim or defense of usury because the statutory language
barring the contention is restricted to "such corporation, its successors, guarantors, assigns or
anyone in its behalf."
44. 427 F. Supp. 662 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
45. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.02 (Vernon 1971) provides:
Except as otherwise fixed by law, the maximum rate of interest shall be ten
percent per annum. A greater rate of interest than ten percent per annum unless
otherwise authorized by law shall be deemed usurious. All contracts for usury are
contrary to public policy and shall be subject to the appropriate penalties prescribed in Article 1.06 of this Subtitle.
46. 526 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ), noted in 29 Sw. L.J. 959 (1975).
47. Id. at 256.
48. The Skeen opinion also contained the following language: "While it is true that the
corporate entity may be disregarded where it is used as a cloak or cover for fraud or some other
transaction tainted with illegality, such is not the situation in this instance." Id.
49. 427 F. Supp. at 666.
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B. Definition of Interest
In Boyd v. Life Insurance Co. 10 a borrower made the contention that a
prepayment penalty constituted interest. 1 The court of civil appeals held the
charging of a prepayment penalty was not for the use of money "but for the
privilege of repaying the loan before maturity." 52
Delta Enterprises v. Gage5" presents a somewhat more interesting fact
picture. Certain payments made to defendant Gage were denominated "interest" in option contracts for the purchase of real estate. Upon the exercise
of the options, the purchaser of the land, in addition to the purchase price of
the real estate, paid the full amount of the "interest," which was computed
from the date of the purchase of the options to the date set for the closing of
the sale. The purchaser later instituted suit, contending that by computing
the "interest" from the date of the purchase of the option the defendant
received interest in excess of double the amount allowed by law.
Defendant, on the other hand, argued that the option contracts were
ambiguous, and introduced parol evidence to the effect that the disputed
payments were really "a variable component of the consideration for the
options in question, or as part of an escalating purchase price at which the
option could be exercised." 54 The jury found that disputed payments were
not interest, and judgment was accordingly rendered for the defendant. In
affirming this judgment, the court of civil appeals held that the substance of
the transaction, and not its form, should control; 5 since the plaintiff admitted in its pleadings that the disputed sum was not for the use, forbearance, or
payments could not possibly fall under the statutory
detention of money, the
56
definition of interest.
C. Settlement of a Usury Claim
One of the most interesting usury cases decided during the survey period
is Skeen v. Slavik.57 In defense of an action for the payment of promissory
notes defendant Skeen made the contention that the notes sued upon were
because the interest
usurious to such an extent that they were unenforceable
58
rates were twice the rates of interest allowed by law.
Plaintiff initially advanced $325,000 to a corporate borrower who executed promissory notes aggregating $425,000 in principal amount which
50. 546 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd).
51. Interest is defined by statute as "the compensation allowed by law for the use or
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01(a)
forbearance or detention of money .....
(Vernon 1971).
52. 546 S.W.2d at 133. See also Gulf Coast Inv. Corp. v. Prichard, 438 S.W.2d 658, 661
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 447 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. 1969).
53. 555 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ).
54. Id. at 557.
55. See Gonzales County Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex. 1976).
56. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
57. 555 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ granted).
58. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(2) (Vernon 1971) provides: "Any person
who contracts for, charges or receives interest which is in excess of double the amount of
interest allowed by this Subtitle shall forfeit as an additional penalty, all principal as well as
interest and all other charges and shall pay reasonable attorney fees set by the court . ... "
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Skeen guaranteed. 9 Subsequently, the first set of notes was cancelled and
new notes aggregating $425,000 were executed, although no new money was
advanced to the corporate borrower.' Skeen also guaranteed payment of
these notes. Thereafter, the corporate borrower repaid all but $200,000 of
the face amount of the notes. After the payments, the corporate borrower
signed two new notes aggregating in the principal amount of $220,000.61
Once again, both notes were guaranteed by Skeen. Approximately five
months later, Skeen entered into a "put and call" agreement with plaintiffs
under which Skeen was paid $300,000 for stock in the corporate borrower
and in a second corporation, subject to plaintiff's right to demand repurchase by Skeen of the same stock for $360,000. A new agreement was made
one year later. Skeen paid $50,000 to plaintiffs and $5,000 to their attorney,
executed two promissory notes in the separate amounts of $310,000 and
$235,950, and executed a release of all liability "for any causes of action
which may have accrued up to that date, including usury claims growing out
.62
of the loan transactions and 'put and call' agreement ....
Skeen contended that the original loan agreement and the "put and call"
arrangement were all usurious loan transactions because the amount of
money "advanced" by plaintiffs was substantially reduced by so-called
"loan fees." Moreover, he maintained that the settlement and release agreement were ineffective because the two notes he executed in connection with
the release carried forward the usurious obligations. The court of civil
appeals agreed.
Plaintiffs sought to uphold the validity of the loan fees on the ground that
they constituted bona fide loan fees. Their argument was premised upon the
holding in Gonzales County Savings & Loan Association v. Freeman63 that a
fee which commits a lender to make a loan at some future date is not interest
but merely the purchase of an option. In rejecting this argument, the court of
civil appeals noted that, regardless of the label, a charge which is admittedly
for the use, forbearance, or detention of money constitutes interest. Thus,
the court followed the requirement enunciated in Gonzales County that a
court must look beyond superficial appearances in determining the existence
or nonexistence of usury. 64
The fact that the court of civil appeals accepted the defendant's argument
that the signed release was ineffective because the usurious charges were
"carried forward" also raises the question of whether, and by what means,
a lender can compromise a cause of action based upon usurious transactions. It has long been established that a usury claim can be compromised
59. Plaintiff testified that the additional $100,000 obligation was in exchange for using
plaintiff's credit in obtaining the money and for undertaking the risk in lending the money. 555
S.W.2d at 520.
60. Twenty-thousand dollars of the initial $325,000 cash advance had been paid by the
corporate borrower before the execution of the second series of notes. Id. at 519.
61. The principal increase of $20,000 represented a loan fee, according to testimony of
plaintiff. Id.
62. Id.
63. 534 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1976), discussed in Dorsaneo, supra note 16, at 228.
64. "[W]hether or not a charge labeled a 'commitment fee' is merely a cloak to conceal
usury may depend upon whether or not the fee is unreasonable in light of the risk to be borne by
the lender." 534 S.W.2d at 906.
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under Texas law.6" The removal of the taint of usury, however, cannot be
accomplished merely by a renewal, or successive renewals, of an originally
usurious contract. 66 The usurious character of the original transaction must
be purged. For example, if the releases are integral parts of prior loan
67
transactions that are tainted by usury, the releases will not be effective.
Furthermore, when a lender who is faced with an action for usury reduces
the final payment to a sum that also diminishes the amount of interest paid
over the loan term, he does not thereby avoid statutory penalties.A On the
other hand, when a bona fide dispute exists with regard to whether usurious
interest has been exacted, the parties may settle the dispute and compromise
69
their differences.
Frozen Funds-Spreading
In Miller v. First State Bank7 ° a husband and wife signed a note for
$70,000 bearing interest at the rate of ten percent per annum. The term of the
note was three years, with accrued interest payable annually on the anniversary date of the note. Pursuant to an agreement with the lender, $14,000 of
the original advance of $70,000 was frozen by the bank to prevent the
borrowers from withdrawing this amount and to guarantee payment of
interest during the first two years of the loan term. The borrowers also gave
the bank two post-dated checks of $7,000 each which the bank was authorized to cash on the first and second anniversary dates respectively.
Hence, the cash advance represented by the loan available to the borrowers
was $56,000. On the first anniversary date of the note, the first post-dated
check was cashed, and one-half of the frozen funds was applied to the
payment of accrued interest. Before the second anniversary date, the husband died, and as a result the bank did not cash the check. 7 The remaining
$7,000 had, however, been commingled by the bank with its own funds and
all or part of the $7,000 had been loaned to other customers. In effect,
although the bank was unable to make a bookkeeping entry with respect to
the second post-dated check, it had full use of the retained funds from the
date that the $14,000 was frozen. Thereafter, the wife paid the $70,000 face
amount of the note, and deposited $7,000, representing interest accrued
during the third loan year, into the registry of the court. Individually and in
D.

65. See Stout v. Ennis Nat'l Bank, 69 Tex. 384, 8 S.W. 808 (1887); Cotton v. Thompson,
159 S.W. 455, 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1913, no writ). See also Smith v. Brewer, 149
S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941, writ dism'd).
66.

Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 87, 138 S.W.2d 531, 534 (1940). See also

71.

Id. at 94. See TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 4.405 (Vernon 1968).

Hurley v. National Bank of Commerce, 529 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in Dorsaneo, supra note 16, at 234.
67. Finn v. Alexander, 139 Tex. 461, 163 S.W.2d 714 (1942). In both El Paso Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n. v. Lane, 81 Tex. 369, 17 S.W. 77 (1891), and International Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Biering, 86 Tex. 476, 25 S.W. 622 (1894), the court held, however, that payment upon a usurious
contract should be applied to the principal even if it was received as interest.
68. Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc., 516 S.W.2d 136
(Tex. 1974).
69. Gibson v. Hicks, 47 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1932, writ ref'd). See
also Cotton v. Thompson, 159 S.W.455, 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1913, no writ).
70. 551 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ granted).
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estate, she then sued the bank to
her capacity as executrix of her husband's
72
recover twice the usurious interest.
The bank counterclaimed for $14,000, an amount representing interest for
the last two years of the loan. The bank denied that the loan transaction was
usurious because: (1) the husband and wife had use of the $70,000 which had
been deposited in their account; (2) the checks had been post-dated for
interest to be paid only on the anniversary date; (3) the $14,000 had been
placed in a "special account," title to which remained in the borrowers; (4)
the husband and wife were estopped to claim usury since the freezing of the
funds had been proposed by their authorized representatives, and the idea
had not originated with the bank; (5) after the freeze agreement had been
made, the bank had never refused to allow the borrowers to withdraw the
frozen funds; and (6) Texas usury law provides for a penalty only for twice
the amount of interest that has actually been paid. The plaintiff argued that
the $14,000 was not owed because the sum represented a charge for usurious
interest.
On appeal from a judgment in favor of defendant bank the court of civil
appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the plaintiff in her individual
capacity; plaintiff was awarded $70,000, representing double the amount of
interest ($42,000) plus recovery of $7,000 frozen in her account, the $7,000
deposited in the registry of the court, and the $14,000 representing the
difference between the $70,000 paid and the amount of the cash advance. In
rejecting the bank's first argument, the court of civil appeals concluded that
despite the fact the $14,000 was not formally frozen until approximately five
days after the $70,000 was deposited in the borrowers' account, all parties
understood that they would never control the fund at any time. Since the
husband and wife had orally agreed not to withdraw the $14,000, "[tihe
possibility . . .[that they] could have avoided their oral contract . . . by
withdrawing funds from their account between the date of the funding and
a matter of a few
the date the freeze order appeared on the Bank records,
73
days, [did] not alter the substance of the transaction.
The bank's second contention was that a prepayment of interest does not
violate the usury statutes. Relying upon Bothwell v. Farmers'&Merchants'
State Bank & Trust Co. ,74 the bank contended that, since interest may be
retained in advance at the maximum legal rate for one year, such interest
may also be retained in advance for two years. This argument was dismissed
as fallacious. 75 The bank's third argument, premised upon the "special
account" theory, was unacceptable because the bank's only purpose in
treating the $14,000 as a special account for a special purpose was to pay
72. 551 S.W.2d at 94. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon 1971)
which provides:
Arty person who contracts for, charges or receives interest which is greater than
the amount authorized by this Subtitle, shall forfeit to the obligor twice the
amount of interest contracted for, charged or received, and reasonable attorney's
fees fixed by the court provided that there shall be no penalty for a violation
which results from an accidental or bona fide error.
73. 551 S.W.2d at 96.
74. 120 Tex. I,30 S.W.2d 289 (1930).
75. "In Texas the rule sanctioning the reservation of interest in advance at the highest

conventional rate for a year or less is too firmly established to be departed from .
6, 30 S.W.2d at 291 (emphasis added).

d. at
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itself. In rejecting the bank's fourth argument, the court of civl appeals
concluded that it was immaterial that the form of the loan was suggested by
the borrowers or their agents since as a lender it was presumed to recognize
usury on sight. 76 The bank's fifth argument, that its liability should be
limited to twice the amount of interest actually paid, was also rejected.
Citing Windhorst v. Adcock Pipe & Supply Co.,77 the court of civil appeals
concluded that since the bank charged the borrowers the interest, the penal78
ties were triggered.
The bank also contended that if the $14,000 interest payment had been
spread over the life of the loan, then no interest in excess of ten percent per
annum would have been contracted for or charged; thus, even if the frozen
funds were considered as interest payments made at the time the funds were
frozen, if payment had been spread over the life of the loan, no usury would
have resulted. Nevertheless, since no savings clause requiring the interest to
be spread had been included in the note, the court held that the prepayment
of interest in excess of ten percent per annum in any one year resulted in a
79
violation of the usury statute.
Two other aspects of the opinion are worthy of note. First, despite the
fact that the trial court held that the husband's cause of action terminated on
his death, the wife was awarded full recovery in her individual capacity as a
joint obligor. Although the court of civil appeals cited Pinemont Bank v.
DuCroz,80 which held that an amount twice the total interest contracted for,
charged, or received represents the maximum forfeiture recoverable under
article 5069-1.06 regardless of how many makers are individually liable on
the note, the court interpreted Pinemont to hold that "the total amount of
usurious interest will be awarded to the successful plaintiffs-whether one
or several." 8 ' While this holding creates no procedural problems under the
present fact situation, it leaves unanswered the question of the potential
double liability of the bank and the res judicata effect of a judgment in favor
of one maker upon a subsequent suit by another maker.8 2 Secondly, the wife
was permitted to recover an amount in excess of twice the amount of
interest for which the parties had contracted. The court of civil appeals
reasoned that "[t]o effectuate the intent of the usury statute, the [$14,000]
76. 551 S.W.2d at 98. See, e.g., Moore v. Sabine Nat'l Bank, 527 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Townsend v. Adler, 510 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ).
77.

542 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976), rev'd per curiam, 547 S.W.2d 260 (Tex.

1977). The court of civil appeals held that the charging of interest in excess of the amount
authorized by statute is not actionable unless charged pursuant to an agreement. The supreme
court found the holding to be contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. For further
discussion of this case see text accompanying notes 85-87 infra.
78. 551 S.W.2d at 101.
79. Id. at 98. The court of civil appeals stated that "if there is a savings clause in the loan
agreement which requires any otherwise usurious interest to be spread, then, of course, usury
has not resulted." See Imperial Corp. of America v. Frenchman's Creek Corp., 453 F.2d 1338
(5th Cir. 1972). But see Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 25 (Oct. 22, 1977).
80. 528 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in Dorsaneo, supra note 16, at 230.
81. 551 S.W.2d at 100.
82. Must the other makers obtain their "share" from the original plaintiff, or may they sue
the bank while at the same time asserting that it is estopped by the prior judgment to deny
liability?
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interest payment should be returned to Mrs. Miller before she recovers
twice the interest charged, so that the net effect is a forfeiture of twice the
interest charged." '8 3 Under this analysis the penalty provided in article
5069-1.06(1) is not only twice the amount contracted for or charged but
also the amount of "interest" paid. This analysis was, however, ultimately
rejected by the supreme court which held that usurious interest paid could
not be recovered under article 5069-1.06.1
In Windhorst v. Adcock Pipe & Supply Co.8 5 the Texas Supreme Court
reversed the holding of the Waco court of civil appeals that "the charging of
interest in excess of the amount authorized is not actionable unless charged
pursuant to an agreement of the parties, or actually collected." 86 The supreme court held that "[b]y describing the conditions . . . in the disjunctive, the Legislature made it clear that only one such condition need occur to
trigger penalties; either a contract for, a charge of or receipt of usurious
interest.'

'87

The troublesome question of how front-end charges should be treated was
addressed squarely in Tanner Development Co. v. Ferguson.88 In the latter
part of 1973 Tanner conveyed unimproved land to Ferguson in consideration
of a cash payment and the execution and delivery of a promissory note in the
principal sum of $226,388.77, with interest at nine and one-half percent per
annum. The note called for payment of the first year's interest in advance.
Additionally, the note provided for quarterly payments of interest in advance on the twentieth day of January, April, July, and October of each
calendar year, from January 20, 1974, until January 20, 1977, with principal
payments to be made thereafter. Ferguson paid the first year's interest on
November 12, 1973. He also made six quarterly interest payments and a
partial payment of the quarterly payment due on July 20, 1975. Subsequently, Tanner declared the unpaid balance of the note immediately due and
payable and gave notice of acceleration.
Ferguson instituted suit to recover statutory penalties and alleged that the
contract was usurious. The trial court held that the note was not usurious,
but the court of civil appeals reversed and rendered judgment for Ferguson.8 9 Although Ferguson argued on appeal that under Commerce Trust Co.
v. Ramp" the "squeezed" interest in the first year made the note usurious
on its face, the court of civil appeals rejected this contention, apparently
because the note contained a savings clause. 91 Instead, the court held that
83. 551 S.W.2d at 103.
84. 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 236 (1977). See Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union, 533
S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1976); Johns v. Jaeb, 518 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ),
discussed in Henderson, Commercial Transactions, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J.
118, 137-38 (1976).
85. 547 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. 1977).
86. 542 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976).
87. 547 S.W.2d at 261.
88. 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 25 (Oct. 22, 1977), motion for rehearing denied, 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
103 (Dec. 10, 1977).
89. 541 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1976).
90. 135 Tex. 84, 138 S.W.2d 531 (1940). See also Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Hockley County
Seed & Delinting, Inc., 511 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), writ ref'd n.r.e. per
curiam, 516 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1974).
91. 541 S.W.2d at 490. For a related discussion of Miller v. First State Bank, 551 S.W.2d 89
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ granted), see text accompanying notes 70, 73, 78, & 79
supra.
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because the first year's "interest" was paid in advance the actual principal
of the note was $204,888.84, i.e., the face amount of the note minus the prepaid interest for the first year. The maximum interest permitted by law at the
rate of ten percent per annum on the actual principal is, however,
$101,422.67. Consequently, since interest required by the note "on its face
amount calculated a 9 1/2% per annum as called for in the note is $106,520.42
• . . [tihe note requires a payment of interest in the amount of $5,087.75
more than maximum allowed by law." 92 Although the defendant contended
that the first year's interest should not have been deducted because the
transaction in question was not a loan of money but rather was a sale of real
estate, 93 the court failed to see any distinction.
The supreme court reversed the judgment of the court of civil appeals. 94
In the course of its opinion, the court made three significant holdings. First,
the court noted that even though negotiations of the parties may have some
relevance in ascertaining the dominant purpose and intent, "once the agreed
terms have been reduced to writing in the form of a compulsory contract,
the test of alleged usury is not concerned with which party might have
originated the alleged usurious provisions. 95 Secondly, the supreme court
held that the first year advance payment of interest should not have been
deducted in ascertaining the true principal since:
[t]he transaction was not a loan of money from which any fee, commission or interest was withheld from the payor. Rather it was a sale of real
estate in which Ferguson received a deed to ten acres of land in
exchange for his cash down payment and the delivery of the . . .
note. . . . None of the consideration for [the] note was reserved by
Tanner or returned . . . to Tanner. Ferguson had at all times the full
use and benefit of the ten acres ....
96
Moreover, the note was a no personal liability note. 97 Finally, the court ruled
that:
[s]ince the contract in question provided Ferguson, the payor, with the
full use of the consideration represented by the actual face amount of
the note (the ten acres of land) for the entire term of the contract, ...
we are compelled to hold that the advance interest payment under the
present98 note should be spread over the entire term of the contract
92. 541 S.W.2d at 491. But see the method of computation applied in Nevels v. Harris, 129
Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1937).
93. 541 S.W.2d at 491.
94. 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 25 (Oct. 22, 1977), motion for rehearing denied, 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
103 (Dec. 10, 1977).
95. Id.at 26-27.
96. Id. at 28. It should be noted that on rehearing, when the respondent pointed out the
artificiality of the distinction, the court stated:
[W]e reiterate that in cash loan transactions from which the lender deducts
interest, fees, commissions or other front-end charges, the amount of dollars
actually received or retained by the borrower is held to be the 'true' principal. In

such cases the amount of the stated principal is reduced accordingly in testing for
usury. See Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1937) . . ..
21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 104.
97. Id. This is the soundest basis for the distinction. A "no personal liability note" requires
the payee to look only to the liens on the property for satisfaction of the "debt." Id.
98. 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 31.
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CONSUMER LOAN PROBLEMS

A. Case Development
In Thornhill v. Sharpstown Dodge Sales, Inc." the lender miscalculated
the amount of the finance charge and charged the borrower a time price
differential forty-two cents in excess of the amount permissible under the
statute regulating the financing of motor vehicles." °° The court of civil
appeals upheld the trial court's instructed verdict for the defendant with
respect to plaintiff's claim for statutory penalties1"' by applying the rule of
de minimis non curat lex, the law will not concern itself with insignificant
matters. 0 2 Because the insurance was not procured from the seller 1° a the
court also overruled plaintiff's contention that the seller was required to
state in the contract the kind, coverage, term, and amount of premium for
the required physical-damage insurance on the motor vehicle. °
In Chavez v. Aetna Finance Co. 105 a noteholder instituted suit to recover
the entire unpaid balance of a note, including an amount representing unearned interest. The defendant counterclaimed, alleging that the lender's
failure to rebate unearned interest increased the amount of interest beyond
that permitted by law. The defendant further alleged a violation of the
federal Truth in Lending Act"° because the lender failed to "clearly and
conspicuously"'' 07 disclose to the borrower "[t]he amount, or method of
computing the amount, of any default, delinquency, or similar charges
payable in the event of late payments."'' 0 8
The court of civil appeals concluded that the suit for the entire unpaid
balance, including earned and unearned interest, would have constituted an
acceleration exceeding the permissible interest rate only if the plaintiff had
also sought default charges. Since the plaintiff made no demand for the
default charges to which it was entitled, it "in effect rebated more than it
was required to refund under the statute."' 1 9 The court, however, agreed
with defendant's second contention that the required disclosure was not
clearly and conspicuously made because the default charge could only be
ascertained by referring to two separate instruments, neither of which
99. 546 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ).
100. Id. at 152. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-7.03(1)-(2) (Vernon 1971).
101. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069--8.01 (Vernon 1971).
102. 546 S.W.2d at 152. See also Hight v. Jim Bass Ford, Inc., 552 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1977, writ granted).
103. 546 S.W.2d at 153. But see Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Mannix, 557 S.W.2d 755 (Tex.
1977), where the court defined "seller-procured insurance" as including:
any insurance coverage whereby the seller becomes involved in the insurance
acquisition process or directly or indirectly benefits from such insurance
coverage. This involvement may be accomplished by actual sales of insurance
policies, . . . receipts of direct or hidden commissions, financing of insurance
purchases from other sources, or by other similar devices. Only that insurance
obtained totally independent of the seller and from which the seller will obtain no
direct or indirect benefit from the procuring of the required insurance shall be
considered 'buyer provided.'
Id. at 768-69.
104. 546 S.W.2d at 153; See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-7.06(l)-(2), (6) (Vernon
1971).
105. 553 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Civ. App.-r-San Antonio 1977, writ dism'd).
106. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (1970). See also 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1977).
107. 553 S.W.2d at 177. See also 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(a) (1977).
108. Id. § 226.8(b)(4) (1977).
109. 553 S.W.2d at 177; see id. at 178-80 (Cadena, J., dissenting).
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referred to the other.' 10 Hence, the defendant was held to be entitled to
recover twice the amount of the finance charge in addition to court costs and
attorneys' fees."'
In Page v. Central Bank & Trust Co. "I a bank charged interest on
installment loans in excess of the statutory maximum under article 50694.01 13 The bank contended that the charge was the result of "an accidental
and bona fide" error. 114 The court of civil appeals agreed with the bank's
contention since the transcript contained at least some evidence to support
the trial court's finding of fact that the excess charge was the result of a
mathematical error," 5 and accordingly held for the plaintiff-bank.
In Southwestern Investment Co. v. Mannix'16 the supreme court determined
that the investment company, both the drafter and the assignee of a retail
installment contract used by the seller of the goods, was liable to the
8
borrower for statutory damages under both federal' 17and state law. Disag9
reeing with the Waco court of civil appeals"1 concerning the violations
which the lower appellate court found, the supreme court nevertheless
affirmed because although the retail installment contract provided that the
buyer should insure the goods, it insufficiently specified the kind, coverage,
term, and amount of premium for that insurance. 210 Moreover, the supreme
court found that the installment contract, which provided that the assignee
had the right to remove the goods from the buyer's property even if such
removal would require a forcible entry on the buyer's property, violated
article 5069--6.05.12 1 Holding that such action by the assignee would constitute a "breach of the peace,'1 22 the court further concluded that the contrac110. Id. at 178 (Cadena, J., dissenting).

Ill. Id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974), (provides that as a penalty for
failing to comply with regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(4) (1977), a lender will be liable for
twice the total of the finance charge, court costs and attorneys' fees).
112. 548 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, no writ).
113. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-4.01(l)-(2) (Vernon 1971).
114. The prescribed penalty is found in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.01 (Vernon
Supp. 1978).
115. Both Guetersloh v. CIT Corp., 451 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Western Bank & Trust Co. v. Ogden, 93 S.W. 1102, 1104 (Tex. Civ. App.
1906, no writ), suggest that the defense applies only to computational or clerical errors and
perhaps only small ones. See text accompanying notes 133, 188 infra.
116. 557 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. 1977).
117. Id. at 755-56. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
118. 557 S.W.2d at 761-65. See also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.01 (Vernon
Supp. 1978). The statute is discussed in the text accompanying notes 127-37 infra.
119. 540 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976).
120. 557 S.W.2d at 762. See also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069--6.04 (Vernon 1971).
121. 557 S.W.2d at 763-64. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069--6.05(4) (Vernon Supp.
1978) provides:
No retail installment contract or retail charge agreement shall:
(4) Provide for a waiver of the buyer's rights of action against the seller or
holder or any other person acting therefore for any illegal act committed in the
collection of payments under the contract or agreement or in the repossession of
goods ....
122. See TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.503 (Vernon Supp. 1978) (emphasis added):
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed
without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may
proceed by action. If the security agreement so provides the secured party may
require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available to the secured
party at a place to be designated by the secured party which is reasonably
convenient to both parties. Without removal a secured party may render equipment unusable, and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under
Section 9.504.
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tual provision'23 resulted in a waiver of a legal right of action in violation of
article 5069-6.05.
The supreme court agreed with the conclusion below that the contract did
not comply with regulation Z124 because both a contractual provision for the
acquisition of a security interest in after-acquired property and a provision
that the property also serve as security for future advances appeared on the
125
back of the document rather than on the front or first page. It may be
by the
applied
noteworthy that the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex

case was not mentioned by
Beaumont court of civil appeals in the Thornhill
26
the supreme court in the Mannix opinion.'
B.

Statutory Amendments

Several significant statutory provisions in the area of consumer credit
were enacted by the Texas Legislature during this survey period. Article
5069-8.01127 was amended to provide that the liability of any person who
violates subtitle 2 of the Texas Consumer Credit Act 128 or chapter 14 of this
title 129 by:

(i) failing to perform any duty or requirement specifically imposed on
him by any provision of this Subtitle or Chapter 14 of this Title, or by

(ii) committing any act or practice prohibited by this Subtitle or Chapter
14 of this Title, shall be liable to the obligor for a penalty in an amount
equal to twice the time price differential or interest contracted for,
charged, or received but not to exceed $2,000 in a transaction in which
the amount financed is $5,000 or less, and not to exceed $4,000 in a
transaction in which the amount financed is in excess of $5,000 and
reasonable attorneys' fees fixed by the court. 30
The statute was also amended by the addition of three defenses. Under
new article 5069-8.01(f),1 31 a person may not be held liable in any action
brought under article 8.01 involving a contract for or receipt of interest, time
price differential, or other charges greater than the amount authorized by
123. As set out in the opinion, the contract provided:
Nothing shall prevent the Secured Party from removing [the property] from any
premises to which same may be attached, upon default or breach of this Retail
Installment Contract and Security Agreement or any part thereof, and the Debtor
agrees to sustain the cost of repairs, if any, of any physical injury to the real estate
caused by such removal.
557 S.W.2d at 763.
124. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8 (1977) (emphasis added) provides:
(a) . . . All of the disclosures shall be made together on either:
(I) The note or other instrument evidencing the obligation on the same side of
the page and above the place for the customer's signature;...
(b) . . . In any transaction subject to this section, the following items, as
applicable, shall be disclosed:
(5) A description or identification of the type of any security interest held or to
be retained or acquired by the creditor in connection with the extention of credit,
• . . If after-acquiredproperty will be subject to the security interest, or if other or
future indebtedness is or may be secured by any such property, this fact shall be
clearly set forth in conjunction with the description or identification of the type of
security interest held, retained or acquired.
125. 557 S.W.2d at 765-66.
126. See Recent Developments, 4 CAVEAT VENDOR 10-12 (1977).
127. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.01 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
.128. Id. arts. 5069-2.01 to -8.05.
129. Id. arts. 5069-14.01 to .28.
130. Id. art. 5069-8.01(b).
131. Id. art. 5069-8.01(f).
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subtitle 2,132 provided he can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, one
of two exonerating circumstances. First, if the violation was not intentional,
but was the result of a bona fide error, notwithstanding the maintenance of
procedures reasonably adopted to avoid such violation, no liability will
attach. Secondly, if an act or omission which would otherwise be violative
of article 8.01 is made in good faith and is in conformity with any existing
rule, regulation, or interpretation of the Texas Consumer Credit Act or of
the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 133 an absolute defense arises,
"notwithstanding that after such act or omission has occurred, such rule,
determined by judiregulation, or interpretation is amended, rescinded, or
1 34
cial or other authority to be invalid for any reason.'
New subsection (h) of article 8.01135 provides three partial defenses. First,
liability under article 8.01 is "in lieu of and not in addition to . . . liability
under the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act." Secondly, a final judgment under the federal statute bars any action under article 8.01 for the same
violation. Finally, a lender may recover from a borrower who obtains a
judgment under article 8.01 and who thereafter brings an action under the
federal act for the same violation the amount recovered by the borrower in
his action under article 8.01 and the lender's reasonable attorneys' fees.
Subsection (c) of article 8.01,136 as recently adopted, provides that a
lender may avoid liability for any violation of subtitle 2 or chapter 14 if, prior
to receiving written notice of the violation from the borrower or prior to the
institution of a suit by the borrower alleging the violation, the lender
corrects the violation. The lender perfects his shield from liability by performing the required duty or act or by refunding any amount in excess of
that authorized by law within sixty days after he actually discovers the
violation.' 37 If the lender does not take corrective action within sixty days
after actual discovery of the violation, but does correct before he is sued or
given written notice of the violation, he is liable only "in an amount equal to
the time price differential or interest contracted for, charged, or received
but not to exceed $2,000 plus reasonable attorneys' fees fixed by the
court."' 38
Changes were also effected in other sections of the Texas Consumer
Credit Act. The criminal penalty for violation of article 5069-8.02139 was
reduced to a maximum fine of $100; 140 otherwise the article is unaltered.
Article 5069-14. 19141 was amended to limit the liability of a lender who fails
to make the required disclosures in transactions entered into after July 1,
132. Id. art. 5069-8.01(a).
133. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (1970).
134. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.01(f) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
135. Id. art. 5069-8.01(h).
136. Id. art. 5069--8.01(c).
137. Id. art. 5069-8.01(c)(1).
138. Id. arts. 5069-8.01(c)(3)-(4).
139. Id. art. 5069--8.02.
140. A potential conflict exists between new subsections (b) and (c) of art. 5069-8.01 and
amended art. 5069-8.02 because the latter speaks in terms of avoiding or limiting liability for
violating subtitle 2, which includes art. 5069--8.02. Further, in this context consideration
should be given to new subsections (f) and (h) of art. 5069-8.01 which focus on penalties to be
imposed for violations arising under art. 5069- 8.01.
141. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-14.19 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
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1975, to the penalties prescribed by chapter 8.142 Under the revised article
5069-6.05(7),143 retail installment contracts or retail charge agreements may
now provide for a first lien on real estate. Before the lien on the real estate
will serve as security for the obligation, however, two conditions must be
met: (1) the contractual lien must arise from agreements for the sale, or the
construction and sale, of a structure to be used as a residence; and (2) the
time price differential may not exceed an annual rate of ten percent. The
definition of "goods" in article 5069- 6.01(a) was changed to include
structures other than mobile homes, used as residences.' 44 Finally, article
5069-7.06 was amended to permit a buyer and seller to agree to include a
separate charge in their vehicle sales contract covering motor vehicle liability insurance, mechanical breakdown insurance, or warranty and service

provisions. 145
V.

RECEIVERSHIP

In Whisenhunt v. Park Lane Corp. 146 a real estate investor attempted to
place a corporation in receivership. Having guaranteed the payment of a
loan made to the corporation, the investor paid the deficiency after the
corporation's default and received an assignment of the note evidencing the
corporation's obligation. Hence, the investor was not a secured or lien
creditor of the corporation.
The district court first considered whether the remedy of receivership was
available to the real estate investor as an unsecured creditor. The court
concluded that although as a general rule unsecured creditors are denied the
remedy,147 general creditors of corporations may be entitled to sue for
receivership under the "trust fund doctrine."' ' 48 This doctrine permits a
court to exercise its equitable powers to require that a corporation's officers, directors, or majority shareholders hold corporate assets which have
been improperly appropriated by such parties in trust for the corporation's
creditors. 49 Reasoning that the doctrine exists to prevent fraud, the court
refused to grant the remedy since no evidence of fraud had been provided.
The court also concluded that because the probability of plaintiff's success
on the merits in a suit to recover on the loan guarantees was unclear,
temporary receivership should not be ordered. 150
In Neel v. Fuller 15 the Texas Supreme Court held that the conveyance,
without court approval, of a royalty interest in property in receivership
142. Id. art. 5069-14.19(i).
143. Id. art. 5069--6.05(7).
144. Id. art. 5069--6.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
145. Id. art. 5069-7.06(8) provides: "If a charge is added to a contract ...
the contract
shall clearly and conspicuously disclose that fact."
146. 418 F. Supp. 1096 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
147. Id. at 1098; see, e.g., Carter v. Hightower, 79 Tex. 135, 137, 15 S.W. 223, 224 (1890)
(construing Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2293 (Vernon 1971)); Parr v. First State Bank, 507
S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ).
148. 418 F. Supp. at 1098.
149. See Texas Consol. Oils v. Hartwell, 240 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Civ. App,-Dallas 1951, and
overr.). See also TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 7.05(A)(2)(a)(b) (Vernon 1956).
150. 418 F. Supp. at 1098.
151. 557 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. 1977).
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could have no force or effect upon the receivership. In so holding, the court
applied the doctrine of custodia legis which was created in order to prevent

interference with the receivership proceedings, including the possession,
control, and distribution of assets. Nevertheless, the court held that to the

extent that the transfer of property in custodia legis does not interfere with
the receivership or unduly complicate the proceedings, the transferee should
be entitled to "step into the shoes" of the transferor. 152 Under such circumstances the transfer would not necessarily be a nullity.'
VI. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT
Since its passage in 1973 the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA)154 has
provided consumers155 relief 156 from false, misleading, or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce. 5 7 Several significant
cases decided during the survey period involve a construction of the provi-

sions of the DTPA. Moreover, the Sixty-fifth Legislature enacted amendments to the DTPA and related statutes which may have a substantial impact
upon the effectiveness of the Act.
A. Case Development
Vargas v. Allied Finance Co. 158 involved the issue of whether, in seeking
to collect on written consumer contracts, the institution of suits in forums
distant from the consumer's residence or from the place of execution
constituted a deceptive trade practice. 59
' Vargas, a resident of Starr County,
had purchased a stereo from a retailer in Hidalgo County. Vargas executed a
promissory note and a retail installment contract in connection with the
purchase. The retailer assigned the note and the contract to Allied Finance
Company. The promissory note was payable in Dallas, Dallas County,
Texas, and the installment contract provided that it was performable in

Dallas, Dallas County, Texas. When Vargas became delinquent in his pay152. Id. at 76.
153. See First S. Properties, Inc. v. Vallone, 533 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1976) (holding sale void).
154. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1978). The original Act
became effective for transactions entered into after May 21, 1973. The 1975 amendments to the
Act became effective Sept. 1, 1975, for subsequent transactions. The 1977 amendments are
discussed in notes 157-67 infra and accompanying text. See Lynn, A Remedy for Undermade
and Oversold Products-The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 698
(1976); Lynn, Anatomy of a Deceptive Trade Practices Case, 31 Sw. L.J. 867 (1977); Maxwell,
Public and Private Remedies Under the Deceptive Trade Practices-ConsumerProtectionAct, 8
ST. MARY'S L.J. 617 (1977).
155. " 'Consumer' means an individual, partnership, or corporation who seeks or acquires
by purchase or lease any goods or services." TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4)
(Vernon Supp. 1978).
156. Id.§ 17.50.
157. Id.§ 17.46.
158. 545 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
159. In apparent response to an article written by Professor Jack Sampson, the venue statute
regulating suits filed in district and county courts was amended in 1976. See Sampson, Distant
Forum Abuse in Consumer Transactions: ProposedSolution, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 269 (1973);
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(5b) (Vernon Supp. 1978). The effectiveness of the
1976 amendment in eliminating "distant forum abuse" was seriously limited for at least two
reasons: (1) art. 1995 does not apply to actions instituted in the justice courts (but see TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2390(4) (Vernon Supp. 1978)), and (2) Texas venue practice requires the
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ments, Allied sued him in a Dallas County justice court. Vargas' plea of
privilege was overruled.
Thereafter Vargas instituted the present action as a class action, seeking
to enjoin Allied from filing consumer collection suits in a county other than
that of the consumer's residence or of the contract's execution. The trial
court granted summary judgment for the finance company. The court of
civil appeals affirmed on the ground that no provision of the DTPA specifically provided that the filing of suits against consumers in a distant forum is
an unfair trade practice. Moreover, the court pointed out that the venue
statutes applicable to justice courts specifically authorized suits to be maintained in a distant forum."6 The court then suggested that the question of
whether the venue statutes should be revised is a matter for the legislature

6
and not for the courts.' 1

In apparent response to the holding in Vargas the Sixty-fifth Legislature
amended the DTPA to provide specifically that in a consumer context a
creditor's filing of a suit based on a written contract in a county other than

the county of the consumer's residence at the time of the filing of suit, or in
the county in which the consumer in fact signed the contract, is a deceptive
trade practice.

162

The legislative amendment may, however, reach far be-

yond remedying the kind of practice employed in the Vargas fact situation.
Given the possibility that the interpretation of the term "consumer" will be
expanded to include "merchants,' 1 63 the amendment may create as much
injustice as it was designed to eliminate.164
From the standpoint of both coverage and available remedies, the supreme court decision in Woods v. Littleton 165 is of prime importance. Plaintiffs in that case had purchased a new home in late 1972. In connection with

the sale the defendants warranted to repair any defect which materialized
within the first year after the date of purchase. When plaintiffs complained
that the sewer system and septic tank had begun to operate in an unsatisfactory manner, defendants undertook on several occasions to correct the
defendant to file a plea of privilege which may be controverted by the plaintiff (see TEX. R. Civ.
P. 86-87). If the plea of privilege is controverted, a venue hearing is held in the county of suit.
Although the burden is upon the plaintiff to demonstrate by a preponderane of the evidence that
venue is proper, the issue is still determined in the distant forum. Moreover, failure to contest
the plaintiff's choice of forum by the filing of a plea of privilege in accordance with the rules of
civil procedure would result in a waiver of the venue rights.
160. But see TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2390(4) (Vernon 1978) (amended to remedy
apparent oversight).
161. 545 S.W.2d at 234.
162. See TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(21) (Vernon Supp. 1978). Although two
subdivisions are numbered "(21)," the latter is the one discussed here.
163. In Trial v. McCoy, 553 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ), the court
of civil appeals concluded that a "merchant" could not be a consumer because the DTPA
defined a "merchant" as a party to a consumer transaction other than a consumer. (See 1973
Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143 § I, at 323). The Sixty-fifth Legislature has, however, deleted the term
"merchant" from the definitional section of the Act and has replaced it with a definition of
"unconscionable action or course of action." TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(5)
(Vernon Supp. 1978).
164. See Bragg, Now We're All Consumers! The 1975 Amendments to the Consumer Protection Act, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. I (1976).
165. 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977). See also Lynn, Anatomy of a Deceptive Trade Practices
Case, 31 Sw. L.J. 867, 877-81 (1977).
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plumbing problems. After May 21, 1973, the effective date of the DTPA,' 6
defendants informed plaintiffs that the system was in good working order.
Plaintiffs based their DTPA claim on the theory that defendants' false
information that the system was in satisfactory condition constituted a
deceptive trade practice. The jury awarded plaintiffs actual damages for
mental anguish and for the diminished value of their home. The trial court
rendered judgment for the plaintiffs but declined to award them treble
damages. The court of civil appeals reversed and remanded on the grounds
that the evidence was insufficient on the question of diminished value and
that the special issue on mental anguish was defective. The court of civil
appeals also commented that the DTPA did not apply to this transaction
because the house was purchased before the effective date of the DTPA.167
Although the supreme court agreed that the case should be reversed and
remanded, it nevertheless found the DTPA to be applicable to the transaction. Despite the fact that the house was purchased before the effective date
of the DTPA, the court held that since the deceptive trade practice occurred
after May 21, 1973, the date of purchase did not control."6 The supreme
court further restricted plaintiffs to damages for mental anguish occurring
after the date of the deceptive practice. 69 In the second significant holding
of Woods v. Littleton the court concluded that "the consumer who proves
all the elements required to recover actual monetary damages shall recover
three times the actual monetary damages and, supported by adequate proof,
reasonable attorneys' fees and court 71costs."' 170 Hence, the award of treble
damages was held to be mandatory.'
The defendants in Woods contended, however, that the plaintiffs were
not "consumers" because they were not individuals who had sought or
acquired "goods or services"; not until 1975 was real property included in
the definition of "goods.' 72 The supreme court was not persuaded,
concluding that the deceptive trade practice arose from the plaintiffs' separate contract for "services.' 173 Under this analysis, the plaintiffs were
"consumers." This difficulty would, of course, not have arisen had the sale
1, 1975, the date upon which
of the house occurred on or after September
74
the 1975 amendments took effect. 1
166.

See TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.63 (Vernon Supp. 1978).

167. 538 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976).
168. 554 S.W.2d at 665. See also Town & Country Mobile Homes v. Stiles, 543 S.W.2d 664
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ); Crawford-Chevrolet, Inc. v. McLarty, 519 S.W.2d 656
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ).
169. 554 S.W.2d at 671-72.
170. Id. at 669.
171. See also McDaniel v. Dulworth, 550 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no
writ), which held treble damages to be mandatory.
172.

See TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(1), (4) (Vernon Supp. 1978). See also

Bragg, supra note 164.
173. 554 S.W.2d at 666-67. "Services" means "work, labor, or service purchased or leased
for use, including services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods." TEX. Bus.
& COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(2) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
174. See Recent Developments, 4 CAVEAT VENDOR 6 (1977). While the court has not decided
whether a pre-May 21, 1973, sale of real estate alone can give rise to a cause of action under the
DTPA, Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977), suggests that the court is likely to
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In Doyle v. Grady75 the Texarkana court of civil appeals held that under
section 17.56 of the DTPA the plaintiff must plead and prove a cause of
action at the venue hearing in order to maintain venue in the county where
the defendant is "doing business.' 76 In apparent response to Doyle, the
Sixty-fifth Legislature amended section 17.56 to provide: "An action
brought which alleges a claim to relief under Section 17.50 of this subchapter
may be commenced in the county in which the person against whom the suit
is brought resides, has his principal place of business, or has done business.' 177 This amendment apparently removes the requirement that the
cause of action be proved at the venue hearing. Significantly, the phrase
"has done business" replaces the requirement of present business activity.
Moreover, the phrase is not modified by the specification of any particular
that the cause of action arise
time period; nor has any express requirement
8
from the business done been included.17
Several interesting cases decided during the survey period deal with the
recovery of attorneys' fees in connection with a DTPA action. In Cordrey v.
Armstrong 9 the question presented to the court of civil appeals was
whether, in the absence of any other recovery, plaintiffs may recover
attorneys' fees. In construing section 17.50(b) of the DTPA, 180 the court held
that a plaintiff who has relied on a false representation concerning the
amount of mileage on an automobile may not recover attorneys' fees or
court costs where, despite the false representation, the jury finds no actual
damages. The court of civil appeals reasoned that since plaintiffs only
sought money damages, which were denied, the trial court's award of
approach these issues if and when they arise with the notion that the DTPA "shall be liberally
construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes." TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §
17.44 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
175. 543 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
176. "An action brought under Section 17.50or 17.51 of this subchapter may be commenced
in the county in which the person against whom the suit is brought resides, has his principal
place of business, or is doing business." 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, § I, at 322.
177. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.56 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
178. Section 17.47(b) was also amended to provide:
An action brought under Subsection (a) of this section [public enforcement of
DTPA by Attorney General] which alleges a claim to relief under this section may
be commenced in the district court of the county in which the person against
whom it is brought resides, has his principal place of business, has done business,
or in the district court of the county where the transaction occurred or, on the
consent of the parties, in a district court of Travis County.
Id. § 17.47(b).

179. 553 S.W.2d 798 (Tex, Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ).
180. Section 17.50 was amended to provide:
(b) In a suit filed under this section, each consumer who prevails may obtain:
(I) three times the amount of actual damages plus court costs and attorneys' fees reasonable in relation to the amount of work expended:
(2) an order enjoining such acts or failure to act;
(3) orders necessary to restore to any party to the suit any money or
property, real or personal, which may have been acquired in violation of
this subchapter; and
(4) any other relief which the court deems proper; including the appointment of a receiver or the restoration of a license or certificate authorizing a person to engage in business in this state if the judgment has not
been satisfied within three months of the date of judgment.

TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
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attorneys' fees and costs was erroneous. The court's characterization of its
holding is significant, however, in light of the wording of the DTPA.
We hold that consumers-plaintiffs must obtain some . . . relief [other
than attorneys' fees and court costs] in order to be considered as
prevailing. If plaintiffs had recovered judgment for actual damages,
restoration, or an injunction, then they would have prevailed in the trial
court and could have obtained their attorneys' fees and court1 cost. A
plaintiff may not recover only attorneys' fees and court cost. '
A literal reading of section 17.50(b), however, indicates that recovery of
court costs is available only in connection with a treble
attorneys' fees 8and
2
damage award. 1
In Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Licht 8 3 recovery of attorneys' fees on
appeal under section 17.50(b) was considered. Citing the landmark case of
4
International Security Life Insurance Co. v. Spray,'8 the court of civil
appeals held that the recovery of attorneys' fees on appeal was authorized.18 5 On the other hand, in Bray v. Curtis'816 a defendant attempted to
recover attorneys' fees incurred in connection with the successful defense
of a DTPA action.' 8 7 Since, however, the jury found that the suit was not
groundless or brought for the purpose of harassment, the defendant was not
entitled to recover attorneys' fees for the defense of the DTPA claim.
B. Statutory Amendments
The Sixty-fifth Legislature made a significant change in the DTPA in
connection with defenses to private treble damages actions. Under section
17.50A 88 recovery will be limited to actual damages, reasonable attorneys'
fees, and court costs where the defendant proves that: (1) the action complained of resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the use of reasonable procedures adopted to avoid the error; or (2) he had no written
notice of the consumer's complaint before the institution of suit; or (3) he
tendered to the consumer, within thirty.days after receipt of notice, the
greater of the cash value of the consideration received from the consumer or
of the benefit promised and expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees
incurred by the consumer; or (4) in connection with a DTPA claim based on
the breach of an express or implied warranty, he was not given a reasonable
opportunity to correct the problem before suit.
Other amendments to the DTPA include the following: (1) the addition of
181. 553 S.W.2d 798 at 799.
182. See also Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 669 (Tex. 1977), for the suggestion that
attorneys' fees and court costs would be recoverable by a consumer who obtains only injunctive relief.
183. 544 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ).
184. 468 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1971).
185. 544 S.W.2d at 446.
186. 544 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
187. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978) provides: "On a finding
by the court that an action under this section was groundless and brought in bad faith or for the
purpose of harassment, the court may award to the defendant reasonable attorneys' fees in
relation to the amount of work expended, and court costs."
188. Id. § 17.50A.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 32

a section concerning contribution and indemnity; 8 9 (2) revision of section
17.59 concerning post judgment relief;" 9 (3) the addition of "governmental
entity" to the definition of consumer; 9' (4) removal of the term "merchant"
from the definitional section of the DTPA; 192 (5) the addition of a definition
of "unconscionable action or cause of action" to the definitional section of

the DTPA; 19 3 (6) deletion of the commercial or business use "exemption"

from the definition of "services";1 94 (7) the addition of subsections making
both false representations of completion of work or services, including the

replacement of parts' 95 and distant forum provisions in consumer contracts
deceptive trade practices;'9 (8) revision of the public enforcement provisions of the DTPA; 97 (9) repeal of the class action provision of the DTPA; 98
and (10) removal of the requirement that Federal Trade Commission in-

terpretations of the2 Federal Trade Commission Act' 99 be followed in private
consumer actions.

00

VII. MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS
In Allied Chemical Corp. v. Koonce20' the defendant specially excepted to
the plaintiff's original petition on the ground that the petition showed on its

face that the claim on the promissory note was barred by limitations.
Plaintiff filed a supplemental petition, alleging that in certain letters the

defendant had admitted the existence of the debt and promised to pay it;
therefore plaintiff argued that the defendant had waived the limitation
defense in writing or, alternatively, was estopped from asserting the defense. 20 2 The trial court sustained the defendant's special exception. The
court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on the ground that a
creditor must declare in the new promise to pay the revived debt because
such promise, and not the original debt, constitutes the creditor's cause of
189. Id. § 17.55A.
190. Id. § 17.59.
191. Id. § 17.45(4).
192. Id. § 17.45.
193. Id. § 17.45(5) defines such an act as one which, to a person's detriment: "(A) takes
advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity of a person to a grossly
unfair degree or, (B) results in a gross disparity between the value received and consideration
paid, in a transaction involving transfer of consideration."
194. Id. § 17.45(2).
195. Id. § 17.46(b)(21) (the first subdivision (21)) defines as a deceptive trade practice
representing that work or services have been performed on, or parts replaced in, goods when
the work or services were not performed or the parts replaced."
196. Id. § 17.46(b)(21) (the second subdivision (21)); see notes 162-64 supra and accompanying text.
197. Id. §§ 17.47(a)-(d).
198. Id. § 17.51. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42 was amended effective Jan. I, 1978. The general
provisions of the rule rendered the special class action provisions of the DTPA unnecessary.
See Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, infra, p. 415.
199. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970).
200. TEX. BUs. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
201. 548 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ).
202. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5539 (Vernon 1958) provides:
When an action may appear to be banned by a law of limitation, no acknowledgment of the justness of the claim made subsequent to the time it became due shall
be admitted in evidence to take the case out of the operation of the law, unless
such acknowledgement be in writing and signed by the party to be charged
thereby.
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action. In other words, by failing to amend the original petition to state a
cause of action on the new promise, plaintiff committed a fatal procedural
203
error.
In McLendon v. Todd-Ao-Corp. 201 a judgment creditor brought suit upon
a California judgment. The court of civil appeals stated the familiar rule that
when a party is sued upon a foreign judgment in Texas and introduces a
properly authenticated copy of the judgment he has established a prima
facie case. The burden is then placed upon the defendant to establish
reasons, such as the foreign court's lack of in personam jurisdiction, why
the judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit. 205 The court of civil
appeals held that since the defendant had voluntarily paid the greater part of
the foreign judgment he could not challenge the judgment of the sister state.
Moreover, since the judgment had been paid voluntarily, defendant had
waived his right to appeal. 2° s

VIII.

AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF PROCEDURE: SEQUESTRATION

A. Backround
The constitutional mandate that no state may deprive a person of property
without due process of law 207 has presented significant problems in the
context of extraordinary remedies. In 1977, in an attempt to conform extraordinary remedies to due process requirements outlined by the United
States Supreme Court, the Texas Supreme Court amended the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure governing sequestration, attachment, and garnishment. 2° 8
The Texas Legislature had previously amended article 6840,2 o9 which governs sequestration, in an effort to avoid due process problems. The statutes
concerning the remedies of garnishment 210 and attachment, 21' however, have
not been amended.
Due Process Considerations. In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.212 the
United States Supreme Court held that prejudgment garnishment of wages
without affording the wage-earner notice and a prior hearing constitutes a
deprivation of property without due process of law. 213 Since Texas law
4
prohibits wage garnishment 2W
the decision had no direct impact on the state.
The landmark case of Fuentes v. Shevin, 215 however, appeared to expand the
203. 548 S.W.2d at 82. Although the record did not reflect whether plaintiff was afforded the
opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of his action, the court of civil appeals nonetheless held
that a motion for new trial was required to preserve the error where the party is denied the right
to amend. Id. See also Ainsworth v. Homes of St. Mark, 530 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [ist Dist.] 1975, no writ).
204. 546 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ).
205. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970). See also Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
206. 546 S.W.2d at 654; see Elkins v. Vincik, 437 S.W.2d 49, 51-52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1969, no writ).
207. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § I.
208. Civil Procedure Rules Amended, 40 TEX. B.J. 709 (1977).
209. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6840 (Vernon Supp. 1978) (amended in 1975).

210. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4076 (Vernon 1966).
211.

TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 275 (Vernon 1973).

212. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
213. Id. at 339-42.
214. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 28.

215. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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Court's holding in Sniadach by prohibiting all seizures of property prior to
notice and hearing unless the seizure could be justified by an "extraordinary
situation." In discussing the meaning of the phrase "extraordinary situation," the Fuentes majority focused upon fact situations involving important governmental or public interests." 6 The opinion also suggested that,
under some circumstances, a creditor could make a showing of immediate
danger that the debtor would destroy or conceal the property to be seized
situation"
and this showing would satisfy the "extraordinary
.217
requirement
Thereafter, in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co. 218 the Court upheld the validity
of the Louisiana sequestration procedure which provides that property may
be seized before notice to the debtor and before an adversary hearing is
conducted. The opinion, in contrast to Fuentes, emphasized the interest of
the creditor in the goods seized. Since the creditor had a security interest in
the goods, the Court reasoned that a failure of the debtor to make retail
installment payments would result in the steady diminution of the creditor's
property interest so long as the defaulting debtor remained in possession; 1 9
the continued possession would give the debtor the "power. . . to conceal,
dispose of, or waste the property or the revenues therefrom, or remove the
property from the parish, during the pendency of the action." 22 The Court
concluded that it would be impossible to protect the property from conif the debtor was provided with notice and a
cealment, waste, or transfer
2 21
hearing before the seizure.
Perhaps more significantly, the Mitchell majority provides guidance regarding the procedural safeguards which must accompany the issuance of
the extraordinary writ:
(a) a "judicial" officer must determine whether the property may be
seized prior to notice and an adversary hearing.
(b) the officer must be informed of specific facts which justify the
prehearing seizure. Conclusory "boilerplate" allegations will not
suffice.
(c) the person from whom the property has been seized must be
afforded an opportunity to obtain a judicial hearing at which the
creditor had the burden of proving that the deprivation of the
the controversy is approproperty
. 2 2 pending final determination of

priate

Commentators have attempted to reconcile the seemingly contradictory
holdings of Fuentes and Mitchell.22 3 Arguably, the creditor's preexisting
property interest, which the Court did not discuss in Fuentes, explains the
difference. On the other hand, the Mitchell Court's emphasis on the procedural safeguards which accompanied the seizure may be the decisive
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at 90-91.
Id. at 93.
416 U.S. 600 (1974).
Id.at 608.
Id. at 605 (quoting LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 3571 (West 1961)).
416 U.S. at 608-09.

222. Id. at 616-18.
223. See, e.g., Comment, Constitutional Dimensions of the Amended Texas Sequestration
Statute, 29 Sw. L.J. 884 (1975).
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aspect of the opinion, suggesting the elimination of the "extraordinary
situation" exception in Fuentes.
Two subsequent United States-Supreme Court opinions provide little
assistance in resolving this interpretive dilemma. In North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. 224 a Georgia prejudgment garnishment procedure
was held unconstitutional because it did not incorporate any of the procedural safeguards discussed in Mitchell. The opinion differs only slightly
from Mitchell, referring to an opportunity for an "early," rather than an
"immediate," hearing.
In Carey v. Sugar22 5 the Supreme Court was asked to consider the
constitutionality of the post-seizure hearing provided for by the New York
attachment statute. Although the statute provided for an early post-seizure
hearing, it did not specifically require an inquiry into the merits of a plaintiff's underlying claim. The Court directed the lower federal court to abstain
from a decision concerning the constitutionality of the New York procedure
until a state court construction of this aspect of the statute had been made.
The Court concluded that the state courts may construe the statute to
require the plaintiff to litigate the merits of his underlying claim, despite the
fact that the statute does not expressly require it.
Assuming the "extraordinary situation" concept still exists, it is unclear
whether due process requires an examination of the statutory grounds upon
which each of the extraordinary remedies rests in determining whether the
ground employed constitutes an "extraordinary situation." If a statutory
ground is not "extraordinary," does the Constitution abolish the ground
regardless of the use of procedural safeguards? Is the major consideration
the adequate employment of procedural safeguards, and not the sufficiency
of the legislatively created ground? Although the amendments to the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to provide adequate procedural safeguards, they do not affect the constitutional sufficiency of the statutory
grounds.
B. Sequestration226
Sequestration is a purely ancillary statutory procedure. The purpose of
the procedure is to take specified property, in which the claimant asserts a
preexisting property interest, out of the possession of a party to a suit and
place it in the custody of the court pending final judgment on the issue of
who is entitled to the property.227 The procedure is designed to preserve the
property until a final determination on this issue has been made.228
224. 419 U.S. 601 (1975), noted in 29 Sw. L.J. 660 (1975).
225. 425 U.S. 73 (1976) (per curiam).

226. For further background and forms, see 2 W.

DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE §§

40.01-.203 (1978).
227. Harding v. Jesse Dennett, Inc., 17 S.W.2d 862, 864 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1929, writ ref'd).
228. See Radcliff Fin. Corp. v. Industrial State Bank, 289 S.W.2d 645, 649 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1956, no writ). Sequestration is available only when provided for by statute,
and strict compliance with the statute and applicable rules of procedure is required. See
American Mortgage Corp. v. Samuell, 130 Tex. 107, 111-12, 108 S.W.2d 193, 196 (1937); Hunt
v. Merchandise Mart, Inc., 391 S.W.2d 141, 144-45 (Tex. Civ. App.- Dallas 1965, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
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Sequestration is not proper unless the subject matter of the underlying
229
action is related to the property, sought to be sequestered. Article 6840230
provides that sequestration is available in actions for title, possession, or
partition of the property involved, or in suits where the claimant is seeking
to enforce or foreclose a security interest, lien, or mortgage on the property.
Thus, the claimant must assert a pre-existing property interest in the property which is sought to be sequestered. In addition to listing the type of actions
required for sequestration, article 6840 lists the grounds which will support
sequestration:
1. There is an immediate danger that the defendant will conceal,
remove or otherwise dispose of an item of personal property.
2. There is an immediate danger that the defendant will damage the
property which is sought to be sequestered or that he will convert
the property or its revenues to his own use.
3. The plaintiff has been forcefully or violently ejected from possession of the disputed property.
4. A defendant in the suit is a non-Texas resident and the suit is to try
title to, foreclose a lien on, or partition real property.
The first two grounds for sequestration appear to be extraordinary situations under Fuentes. To the extent that the extraordinary situation requirement of Fuentes still exists, however, there may remain constitutional
23 1
problems with the third and the fourth grounds.
Issuance of the Writ of Sequestration. Judges of the district and county
courts and justices of the peace have the power to issue writs of sequestration at the commencement or during the progress of any civil suit. 23 2 Although due process requires that a "judicial" or "neutral" officer order the
issuance of the writ,233 there should be no objection to the clerk's performing the ministerial task of actually issuing the writ so long as it is issued
234
pursuant to a judicial order.
The application for the issuance of the writ must be made under oath and
must set forth specific facts stating the nature of the plaintiff's claim, the
amount in controversy, the statutory grounds relied upon, and specific facts
relied upon by the plaintiff to justify findings of fact that support the
statutory ground or grounds relied upon. 235 Under rule 696, the application
must comply with all statutory requirements 23 6 and must be supported by
229. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6840, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1978).

230. Id.
231. See notes 215-17 supra and accompanying text; Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 53
L. Ed. 2d 683 (1977).
232. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6840, § I (Vernon Supp. 1978).
233. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 616 (1974). See also North Ga. Finishing,
Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring), noted in 29 Sw. L.J. 660
(1975).
234. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 696. Compare id. with TEX. R. Civ. P. 592 (attachment) and TEX.
R. Civ. P. 658 (garnishment).
235. TEX. R. Civ. P. 696. Compare id. with TEX. R. Civ. P. 592 (attachment) and TEX. R.

Civ. P. 658 (garnishment). See also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 6840 § 2 (Vernon Supp.
1978).
236. There are four statutory grounds upon which the issuance of the writ may be based.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6840, §§ l(b)-(e) (Vernon Supp. 1978). See text accompanying
note 231 supra. A statute provides that a writ of sequestration may be issued before default if

the reasonable conclusion may be drawn that a person's collateral will be injured, ill-treated,
wasted, or converted. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6844 (Vernon 1960).
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affidavits. The supporting affidavits may be based on information and
belief only if the grounds for such belief are specifically stated, and they
may state grounds either disjunctively or conjunctively. The application for
the writ must also include a sufficient description of the property to be
sequestered to identify it and to distinguish it from similar property. The
application must state the value of each article of property and the county in
which it is located. 237 Finally, in ruling on the application, due process
requires that the judicial officer reject conclusory statements concerning the
2 38
fulfillment of the statutory grounds for issuance of the writ.
The clerk may issue the writ only upon a written order following a
hearing, which may be ex parte. The court's written order granting the
application must contain specific findings of fact to support the statutory
grounds which support the application and the writ. Property to be sequestered must be described in the court order with sufficient certainty to
distinguish it from other similar property; in addition to this identification,
the order must state the value of each item to be sequestered and the county
239
in which it is located.
Before the writ of sequestration can issue, the plaintiff must file a sufficient bond with the court.' 4 The court must specify the amount of bond
required of the plaintiff in the court order granting the writ. The bond must,
in the opinion of the court, be sufficient to "adequately compensate defendant in the event plaintiff fails to prosecute his suit to effect and pay all
damages and costs as shall be adjudged against him for wrongfully suing out
the writ." ' 241 Either party may challenge the amount of the bond or the
sufficiency of the sureties.2 42 The court must also indicate in its order the
amount of bond required of the defendant to replevy. 243 Rule 696 establishes
the amount of the bond at the value of the property sequestered or the
amount of the plaintiff's claim plus interest if allowed by law on the claim,
whichever is less, plus court costs.
Contents of the Writ and Service on the Defendant. The Court in Mitchell
v. W. T. Grant Co. held that due process does not necessarily require a preseizure hearing when the person from whom property is taken has available
means to obtain a judicial hearing promptly after the seizure. 244 Rule 700a
requires that the copy of the writ served on the defendant prominently
237. TEX. R. Civ. P. 696. Compare id. with TEX. R. Civ. P. 592 (attachment) and TEX. R.
Civ. P. 658 (garnishment).
238. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 605-07 (1974); Garcia v. Krausse, 380 F.
Supp. 1254, 1258-59 (S.D. Tex. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 534 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1976).
239. TEX. R. Civ. P. 696. Compare id. with TEX. R. Civ. P. 592 (attachment) and TEX. R.
Civ. P. 658 (garnishment).
240. TEX. R. Civ. P. 698. Compare id. with TEX. R. Civ. P. 658a (attachment) and TEX. R.
Civ. P. 592a (garnishment).
241. TEX. R. Civ. P. 696. Compare id. with TEX. R. Civ. P. 592 (attachment) and TEX. R.
Civ. P. 658 (garnishment).
242. TEX. R. Civ. P. 698. Compare id. with TEX. R. Civ. P. 592a (attachment) and TEX. R.
Civ. P. 658a (garnishment).
243. TEX. R. Civ. P. 696. Compareid. with TEX. R. Civ. P. 592 (attachment) and TEX. R.
Civ. P. 658 (garnishment).
244. 416 U.S. 600, 610 (1974). See notes 218-22 supra and accompanying text.
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display in ten-point type, in a manner calculated to advise a reasonably
attentive person, the following message:
YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO REGAIN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY BY FILING A REPLEVY BOND. YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO
SEEK TO REGAIN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY BY FILING
245
WITH.THE COURT A MOTION TO DISSOLVE THIS WRIT.
This language, and the rights of dissolution and modification granted under
rule 712a, 246 help protect the Texas sequestration procedure from constitutional attack.
The writ of sequestration must be directed to a sheriff or any constable
within the State of Texas and must command him to take possession of the
247
property, subject to the right of replevy and further order of the court.
The defendant must be served with a copy of the writ, the application of the
plaintiff, accompanying affidavits, and orders of the court. Service may be
made in any manner prescribed for service of citation or as provided in rule
21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Service must occur as soon as
practicable following the levy of'the writ 248 On the face of the writ, prior to
the required ten-point language quoted above, 249 the writ must state:
To
, Defendant:
You are hereby notified that certain properties alleged to be claimed
by you have been sequestered. If you claim any right in such property,
you are advised: 250 [The language in ten-point type must be placed
here].
Dissolution or Modification of the Writ of Sequestration. Under rule 712a
the defendant may, for any extrinsic or intrinsic ground or cause, seek by
sworn written motion to vacate, dissolve, or modify the writ and the order
directing the issuance of the writ. The motion to dissolve, modify, or vacate
must admit or deny each finding in the court order authorizing the issuance
of the writ; if, however, the moving party is unable to admit or deny a
finding contained in the order, he must state the reasons why he is unable to
admit or deny it. The motion must then be heard promptly, after reasonable
notice to the plaintiff (which may be less than three days) and the issue shall
be determined not later than ten days after the motion is filed. 25 1 Since rule
696 permits ex parte hearings on the issue of seizure, the prompt postseizure hearing requirements set forth in rule 712a constitute the heart of the
new procedure in terms of the satisfaction of due process requirements.
Rule 712a further provides for alteration of the ten-day requirement by
agreement of the parties.
245. TEX. R. Cv. P. 700a. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 700a with TEX. R. Civ. P. 598a
(attachment) and TEX. R. Cv. P. 663a (garnishment).
246. TEX. R. Civ. P. 712a. See notes 251-54 infra and accompanying text.
247. TEX. R. Civ. P. 699. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 699 with TEX. R. Civ. P. 593 (attachment) and TEX. R. Cv. P. 662 (garnishment).
248. TEX. R. Civ. P. 700a. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 700a with TEX. R. Civ. P. 598a
(attachment) and TEX. R. Civ. P. 663a (garnishment).
249. See text accompanying note 245 supra.

250. TEX.
(attachment)
251. TEx.
(attachment)

R. Cv. P. 700a. Compare TEX. R. Ov. P. 700a with TEX. R. Civ. P. 598a
and TEX. R. Civ. P. 663a (garnishment).
R. Civ. P. 712a. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 712a with TEX. R. Ov. P. 608
and TEX. R. Civ. P. 664a (garnishment).
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Once a rule 712a motion has been filed, all other proceedings under the
writ are stayed except for orders relating to the care and preservation of the
property. This stay remains in effect until a hearing is had on the motion and
252
the issue is decided.
Generally, the writ of sequestration is to be dissolved if the plaintiff fails
to prove the grounds relied upon for issuance of the writ. The movant,
however, has the burden of proving, if he so contends, that the reasonable
value of the property sequestered exceeds the amount necessary to secure
253
the sum total of the debt, interest for one year, and probable costs.
In ruling on a motion, the court may make its determination on the basis of
uncontroverted affidavits which set forth facts that would be admissible in
evidence. If the affidavits are controverted the court must make its determination on the basis of evidence submitted by the parties in the normal
manner. In addition to dissolving the writ, the new rules give the court great
latitude in modifying its previous order on the writ if dissolution is not
appropriate. In this connection, if the court determines that the order of the
writ should not be vacated or dissolved, but only modified, it may make
further orders with respect to a replevy-bond filed by the defendant which
254
are consistent with the modification.
Replevy. The defendant may replevy the property at any time prior to
judgment.2 5 5 "If the movant has given a replevy bond an order to vacate or
dissolve the writ shall vacate the replevy bond and" discharge the
sureties.2 5 6 Replevin requires that the defendant give bond with sufficient
sureties; the surety or sureties must be approved by the officer who levied
the writ and must be payable to the plaintiff. The amount of the bond is the
amount fixed by the original court order; that is, an amount equivalent to the
value of the property or the amount of the plaintiff's claim and one year's
interest,7 which ever is the lesser amount, and the probable costs of the
court.

25

If the bond is objectionable to either party, that party, on motion and
notice to the opposing party, has the right to a prompt judicial review of the
amount of the bond required, denial of bond, sufficiency of sureties, or as to
the estimated value of the property in question. Judicial review of these
issues is to be made by the court which authorized the issuance of the writ
on the basis of evidence submitted, or
uncontroverted affidavits setting
258
forth facts which would be admissible.
252. TEX.
(attachment)
253. TEX.
(attachment)

R. Ov. P.
and TEX. R.
R. Civ. P.
and TEX. R.

712a. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 712a with TEX. R. Civ. P. 608
Civ. P. 664a (garnishment).
712a. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 712a with TEX. R. Civ. P. 608
Civ. P. 664a (garnishment).

254. TEX. R. Cv. P. 712a. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 712a with TEX. R. Civ. P. 608

(attachment) and TEX. R. Cv. P. 664a (garnishment).
255. TEX. R. Civ. P. 701. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 701 with TEX. R. Civ. P. 599 (attachment) and TEX. R. Civ. P. 664 (garnishment).
256. TEX. R. Civ. P. 712a.
257. TEX. R. CIv. P. 701. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 702, 703 (condition of bond for personal
property and real estate).
258. TEX. R. Civ. P. 701. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 701 with TEX. R. Civ. P. 599 (attachment) and TEX. R. Civ. P. 664 (garnishment).
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If the defendant fails to replevy the property within ten days after levy of
the writ and the service of notice, the plaintiff may replevy by giving bond
payable to the defendant in the amount of not less than double the value of
the property replevied, with sufficient sureties to be approved by the levying
officer. 259 Under rule 708, if the property to be replevied is personalty, the
condition of the bond shall be either that the plaintiff will preserve the
property in the same condition as when it is replevied, together with the
value of the fruits or revenue thereof, to abide the decision of the court, or
that he will pay the value thereof, or the difference between its value at the
time of replevy and the time of judgment. If the property is realty, the
condition of the bond shall be that the plaintiff will not injure the property
and that he will pay the value of the rents if he is required to do so. On
proper notice by either party, the complaining party can obtain judicial
review of the plaintiff's replevy, just as in the case of defendant's replevy.
26

C. Attachment
The purpose of attachment is to impound and fix a lien upon the nonexempt property of a debtor prior to judgment.2 61 The remedy is structured
primarily to prevent a debtor from making himself judgment proof during
the pendency of litigation. 262 Ordinarily the type of suit which will support
the issuance of the writ is a suit for a debt, 263 which is defined as an
264
obligation to pay a liquidated sum upon an express or implied contract.
The grounds which will support the issuance of the writ in a suit on a debt
are set forth in article 275.265 The statute requires the plaintiff to make an
affidavit stating that one or more of the statutory grounds exist. An additional statutory provision requires the plaintiff to swear that the attachment is
not for the purpose of injuring or harassing the defendant and that the
plaintiff will probably lose his debt unless the attachment is issued. 2" A writ
of attachment may also be issued in suits based on tort or unliquidated
demands if personal service on the defendant cannot be obtained within the
state.267
Most of the amended rules of civil procedure relating to attachment and
garnishment are substantially the same as the amended rules for sequestration. Hence, the amended attachment and garnishment rules will be discussed largely by reference to the corresponding rules for sequestration.
259. TEX. R. Civ. P. 708.

260. For further background and forms, see 2 W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE §§
41.01-.203 (1978).
261. Property of a debtor which is exempt from attachment, execution, or other seizure for
the satisfaction of liabilities is set forth in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 3833-3836 (Vernon
Supp. 1978).

262. Midway Nat'l Bank v. West Tex. Wholesale Co., 447 S.W.2d 709, 710-11 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1969), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 453 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. 1970).
263. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 275 (Vernon 1973).
264. El Paso Nat'l Bank v. Fuchs, 89 Tex. 197, 201, 34 S.W. 206, 207 (1896).
265. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 275 (Vernon 1973).

266. Id.art. 276.
267. Id.art. 281.
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Issuance of the Writ of Attachment. Rule 592268 has established new procedures governing the plaintiff's application for, and the court's issuance of, a
writ of attachment. These new procedures are similar to those instituted in
rule 696, which governs the issuance of writs of sequestration. 269 Rule 592,
like its sequestration counterpart, was designed to meet the constitutional
demands of due process.
Rule 592a requires that the plaintiff file an attachment bond before the
writ will be issued and provides for judicial review, if requested by either
party, of the amount of the bond or the sufficiency of the sureties. 270 The
bond required of the plaintiff is designed to compensate the defendant
adequately in the event the plaintiff fails to prosecute his suit to effect and to
compensate the defendant sufficiently for all damages and costs which may
be adjudged against the plaintiff for wrongfully suing out the writ of attachment. 27 1 The attachment bond requirement is almost identical to the bond
272
required by the rules for sequestration.
Contents of the Writ and Service on the Defendant. The writ of attachment
must be directed to a sheriff or any constable within the state. 273 The
instructions to the sheriff or constable are the same as those given in a writ
of sequestration except that, rather than identifying the specific property to
be sequestered, the sheriff is directed to attach property "of a reasonable
value in approprimately ,the amount fixed by the court. "274 As in the case of
sequestration, the writ of attachment must inform the defendant of his right
to replevy and regain possession by filing a motion to dissolve the writ. 275
Service on the defendant is attained by the same method as is used for
276
service of a writ of sequestration.
Dissolution or Modification of the Writ of Attachment. Rule 608277 governs
dissolution and modification of the writ of attachment. This rule was rewritten to provide for a prompt hearing. The procedure is substantially the same
as the procedure for dissolving or modifying a writ of sequestration discussed earlier. 278 It is, therefore, unnecessary to discuss the procedure here.
268.

TEX. R. Civ. P. 592.

269. See notes 232-39 supra and accompanying text. The court's order must also contain a
specification of the maximum value of the property that may be attached.
270. TEX. R. Civ. P. 592a.
271.

TEX. R. Civ. P. 592. If the attachment is wrongful there are remedies open to the

defendant. If none of the grounds stated in the plaintiff's affidavit for the issuance of the writ
are true, then the attachment is wrongful. See, e.g., Petty v. Lang, 81 Tex. 238, 242, 16 S.W.
999, 1000 (1891). This is true notwithstanding the plaintiff's good faith. See, e.g., Christian v. H.
Seeligson & Co., 63 Tex. 405, 406 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1885, opinion adopted). The party whose
property was wrongfully attached must prove interference with his property rights to be entitled
to more than nominal damages. Bartley v. J.M. Radford Grocery Co., 15 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1929, writ ref'd). When, however, the attachment creditor has acted maliciously and without probable cause, exemplary damages may be in order. See, e.g., Craddock v.
Goodwin, 54 Tex. 578, 586-89 (1881).
272. See notes 240-43 supra and accompanying text.
273. TEX. R. Civ. P. 593.
274. Id. See note 247 supra and accompanying text.
275. TEX. R. Civ. P. 598a. See note 245 supra and accompanying text.
276. See note 247 supra and accompanying text.
277. TEX. R. Civ. P. 608.

278. See notes 251-54 supra and accompanying text.
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Replevy. Rule 599 provides that the defendant may replevy upon the filing
of the required bond. The amount of the bond required of the defendant is
the amount of the plaintiff's claim, one year's accrued interest if allowed by
law, and the estimated costs of court. At the election of the defendant,
however, the bond may be set at the value of the property the defendant
seeks to replevy. Either party is entitled to judicial review of the amount of
the bond, denial of bond, sufficiency of the sureties, and the estimated value
of the property attached. 279 In these regards rule 599 is extremely similar to
the corresponding rule covering sequ~stration.280 The attachment rule, however, further provides that the defendant may move to have property of
equal value substituted for the property attached.
28
D. Garnishment 1
Post-judgment garnishment is a procedure which is available to a judgment-creditor to satisfy his money judgment from the judgment-debtor's
nonexempt personal property in the possession of a third person. 2 2 Only
283
personal property subject to execution can be reached by garnishment.
Post-judgment garnishment is only available where the plaintiff has a valid,
subsisting judgment and the judgment-debtor does not have property in his
284
possession within the state subject to execution to satisfy the judgment.
The Texas statute governing post-judgment garnishment has been found
constitutional 285 notwithstanding that post-judgment garnishment does not
require that a writ of execution be issued, or issued and returned unsatisfied.
Pre-judgment garnishment is also provided for by statute and is available:
(1) when an original attachment has issued; or, (2) when suit is brought for a
debt owed and an affidavit is made by the plaintiff to the effect that the
defendant does not possess property in Texas subject to execution sufficient
to satisfy the debt and the plaintiff is not seeking to injure or harass the
defendant with the writ. 286 The statutory provision for pre-judgment garnishment, however, has been held unconstitutional on the grounds that it freezes
property, prior to judgment in the main suit, in the hands of the third-party

279. TEX. R. Civ. P. 599.
280. See notes 255-58 supra and accompanying text.
281. For further background and forms, see 2 W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE §§
42.01-203 (1978).

282. Beggs v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 52, 106 S.W.2d 1039, 1042 (1937).
283. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 460 S.W.2d 249, 250-51 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1970, no writ).
284.

TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4076 (Vernon 1966). See also Reese v. Piperi, 534

S.W.2d 329, 330 (Tex. 1976). TEX. R. Civ. P. 658 states that an application for a writ of
garnishment may be brought "[e]ither at the commencement of a suit or at any time during its
progress." This appears to imply that a post-judgment application for a writ of garnishment
cannot be made. This conclusion is incorrect. Apparently the rule was written with an eye
toward the problematic area, and, consequently, reference to this non-problematic area was
inadvertantly omitted. Additional support for this conclusion is found in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 1731a, § 2 (Vernon 1962), which provides that the rules enacted by the Supreme Court
of Texas "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of any litigant." Statutory
post-judgment garnishment is still permitted, and could not be repealed by the supreme court's
adoption of a rule of procedure.
285. Ranchers & Farmers Livestock Auction Co. v. First State Bank, 531 S.W.2d 167, 171
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
286. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4076 (Vernon 1966). The debt must be liquidated. See
Cleveland v. San Antonio Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 148 Tex. 211, 215, 223 S.W.2d 226, 228 (1949).
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garnishee, without notice, hearing, or restriction on the pre-hearing seizure
to an extraordinary situation.28 7 The present constitutionality of pre-judg-

ment garnishment is unclear, even under the new rules, because the second
ground for the issuance of the writ is difficult to characterize as an extraordinary situation.
Issuance of the Writ of Garnishment. The application for and issuance of
the writ of garnishment are essentially the same as in the sequestration

situation.288 The requirements for a plaintiff's pre-judgment garnishment
bond are the same as a sequestration bond. 289 When the garnishee's uncontroverted answer reflects that he is indebted to the defendant or has possession of property of the defendant, after due notice to the defendant, the
court in which such garnishment is pending may, upon hearing, reduce the
required amount of the bond to double the sum of the garnishee's indebted-

ness to the defendant, plus29°the value of the property in his possession which

belongs to the defendant.
When the necessary rules have been complied with, the judge must docket
the case in the name of the plaintiff as plaintiff and of the garnishee as
defendant 2 9' and must immediately issue a writ of garnishment.2 92 Under rule
659, the writ, directed to the garnishee, should command him to appear
and answer under oath what, if anything, he owes to the defendantdebtor, and what was his debt to the defendant-debtor at the time the writ
was served. The garnishee must also reveal what property of the defendantdebtor he has in his possession presently, and what property he possessed
when the writ was served. Finally, the garnishee must reveal what other
persons, within his knowledge, are indebted to the defendant-debtor or have
property belonging to him in their possession.2 93
Contents of the Writ and Service on the Defendant. After the court orders
issuance of the writ, which may be in the form prescribed by rule 661,294 the
defendant-debtor is required to be served with a copy of the writ, the
287. Southwestern Warehouse Corp. v. Wee Tote, Inc., 504 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ).
288. See notes 232-39 supra and accompanying text.
289. TEX. R. Civ. P. 658a. See notes 240-44 supra and accompanying text. The bond must be
sufficient to cover any potential damages for wrongful garnishment. TEX. R. Civ. P. 658. The
remedies for wrongful garnishment remain. Garnishment is wrongful if the prescribed allegations set forth in the garnishor's affidavit are untrue. See Peerless Oil & Gas Co. v. Teas, 138
S.W.2d 637, 640 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1940), affd, 138 Tex. 301, 158 S.W.2d 758
(1942). As in attachment, good faith is no defense. Massachusetts v. Davis, 160 S.W.2d 543, 554
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 140 Tex. 398, 168
S.W.2d 216, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 210 (1942). Although good faith is not a defense, the
garnishee cannot recover exemplary damages unless he can prove that the garnishment was
obtained maliciously and without probable cause. See, e.g., Biering v. First Nat'l Bank, 69 Tex.
599, 7 S.W. 90 (1888); Pegues Mercantile Co. v. Brown, 145 S.W. 280, 281 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1912, no writ). Third parties, whose property interests are wrongfully garnished as
belonging to the garnishment debtor, may also maintain an action against the erring creditor.
See Stevens v. Simmons, 61 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1933, no writ).
290. TEX. R. Civ. P. 658a.
291. TEX. R. Civ. P. 659.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. TEX. R. Civ. P. 661.
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application, accompanying affidavits, and orders of the court as soon as
practicable following the service of the writ upon the garnishee.2 95 As in the
case of sequestration, the writ must inform the defendant of his right to
29 6
replevy and to regain possession by filing a motion to dissolve the writ.
The procedure governing dissolution or modification of the writ is substan297
tially the same as the procedure discussed in the sequestration context.
Replevy. The defendant-debtor may replevy at any time before judgment
if the garnished property has not been previously claimed or sold. 29 8 The
defendant-debtor may replevy the property, any part thereof, or the proceeds from the sale of the property if it has been sold under an order of the
court. 299 The procedure necessary to entitle the defendant-debtor to replevy
in garnishment are the same as those in sequestration. 300 Also, just as in
attachment, the defendant-debtor may move to have property substituted
30 1
for the garnished property.
295. TEX. R. Civ. P. 663a. The necessary contents of the writ and service on the defendant
are similar to those set forth in the rules for sequestration. See notes 244-50 supra and
accompanying text.
296. TEX. R. Civ. P. 663a.
297. See notes 251-54 supra and accompanying text.
298. TEX. R. Civ. P. 664.
299. Id.
300. See notes 255-58 supra and accompanying text.
301. TEX. R. Civ. P. 664.

